

From: [REDACTED]
To: Aileen Roder; Andrea Spring; Andrew Weinstein; Chris Murray; David Morenoff; [REDACTED]; Jason Stanek; Jeffery Dennis; Jehmal Hudson; [REDACTED]; Jette Gebhart; John Peschke; [REDACTED]; Kurt Longo; Laura C. Vendetta; Leonard Tao; Mary O'Driscoll; Meghan Estenson; Michael Bardee; Nicholas Tackett; [REDACTED]; Robert Ivanauskas; Robin Lunt; Robin Meidhof; Russell Fairbanks; Sandra Waldstein; Sarah McKinley; Shawn Bennett; Steven Wellner; Terence Burke
Cc: [REDACTED] Craig Cano
Subject: O/G (Rep. JeffDuncan) bulk power system security, Metcalf station (2014-00129)
Date: Thursday, June 12, 2014 9:59:45 AM
Attachments: 2014-00129.pdf
2014r00129.pdf
control sheet.pdf

FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.

--

[REDACTED]
Staff Assistant
Office of External Affairs
202-502-[REDACTED]

JEFF DUNCAN
1RD DISTRICT, SOUTH CAROLINA

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NON-DOCKETED ITEM
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4003

116 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
PHONE: 202.225.5301
303 WEST BELTLINE BOULEVARD
ANDERSON, SC 29625
(864) 224-7401
200 COURTHOUSE PUBLIC SQUARE
LAURENS, SC 29360
(864) 681-1028
jeffduncan.house.gov

April 28, 2014


RE: Roy Mendelsohn

Dear Mr. Hudson,

I have been contacted by the above-named constituent regarding the status of a response to his letter dated February 12, 2014. The letter in question is attached.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Blessings and Liberty,



Jeff Duncan
Member of Congress

[Click here to get updates on important issues sent directly to your email address.](#)

*Please do not reply to this email. The mailbox is unattended.
To share your thoughts please visit my webpage.*

OFFICE OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
2014 MAY 28 3:25
REGULATORY COMMISSION

Ms. Jordan Sherer

Constituent Liaison/District Scheduler

Office of Congressman Jeff Duncan, SC-3

303 West Beltline Blvd.

Anderson, SC 29625

Office: (864) 224-7401

Fax: (864) 225-7049

2014-00129

1131 Summerset Bay Drive
Cross Hill, SC 29332

Mr. Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20426

February 12, 2014

Dear Mr. Wellinghoff,

I watched your interview on PBS News Hour last night (2/11/14) and was appalled that you would publicly discuss the vulnerability of the nation's power system. This information must have been of great value to those who would do our nation harm, including international terrorists and domestic vandals. They will now be aware that most of our substations are protected only by chain link fences with powerful transformers susceptible to high powered rifles fired from a safe distance.

As a constructor, I have been involved in power projects, hydro, fossil and nuclear, and am well aware of the safety requirements for these projects. I was not aware of the apparent vulnerability of the transmission infrastructure. Now I am, along with three quarters of the planet, well aware of this vulnerability, thanks to the information you so freely disseminated on television.

In other correspondence I have had with you and the FERC, I have complained loudly about the overwhelming and suffocating regulatory regime that the FERC imposes on the power industry. Given your remarks that the vulnerability of our power grid infrastructure requires national attention and federal control, it seems you are seeking to impose extended FERC oversight and control and a substantial increase in the bureaucratic burden carried by the power industry, together with a substantial increase in the cost of power to every citizen.

Given that bureaucracies never cease to expand their control and influence, perhaps this was your motive in appearing on the PBS News Hour. You may well be successful. However, you may find yourself presiding over an industry suffering from widespread attacks and damage thanks to the information you made so freely and widely available to those who would do us harm.

I am copying this letter to my Congressman and Senator with a request that Congress convene committees to establish adequate protective measures and to divert any expansion of the FERC's already excessive regulation of the power industry.

Respectfully yours,

Roy Mendelsohn

Copy to: Senator Tim Scott
Congressman Jeff Duncan

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20426

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Jeff Duncan
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

June 10, 2014

Dear Congressman Duncan:

Thank you for your letter dated April 28, 2014, forwarding a letter from your constituent, Mr. Roy Mendelsohn. In his letter, Mr. Mendelsohn expresses concern about public statements made by my predecessor, former FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff, on the physical security of our grid infrastructure. Mr. Mendelsohn also expresses concern about potential Commission actions on this issue, and states his view that Congress should establish adequate protective measures in lieu of FERC regulation.

I became Acting Chairman of the Commission on November 25, 2013. I recognize the importance of the security of the electric grid in the United States, which is essential to our nation's economy and security. Consequently, I have focused on protecting the reliability and security of the grid, as well as the integrity of the Commission in protecting sensitive information. It is vital that the public have confidence that sensitive energy infrastructure information is protected.

Earlier this year, FERC ordered the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to work with the electric industry to develop a standard(s) for improving the physical security of critical facilities on the electric grid (Docket No. RD14-6-000). In that order, the Commission stated that "we anticipate that the number of facilities identified as critical will be relatively small compared to the number of facilities that comprise the Bulk-Power System." NERC and the industry worked quickly to develop that proposed standard and, on May 23, filed it with the Commission for review and approval. The Commission will be seeking public comment on the proposed standard, and Mr. Mendelsohn and others are welcome to submit views on the filing to the Commission. The filing has been designated as Docket No. RM14-15-000.

If I can be of any other assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,



Cheryl A. LaFleur
Acting Chairman

From: Craig Cano
To: Jette Gebhart; Kurt Longo; Steven Wellner
Cc: Mary O'Driscoll; Leonard Tao; Andrea Spring
Subject: RE: NBC Bay Area Investigative Unit - Substation Security
Date: Thursday, September 25, 2014 11:07:08 AM

I gave the reporter, Tony Kovalski, a hard copy of the NOPR, staff presentation and press release when he stopped by during their visit to DC, so they had the info and still missed the mark. But I definitely will point that out to them in hope that any follow-up reports get it right.

Craig Cano
Media Relations / Office of External Affairs
888 First St. NE
Washington, D.C. 20426
(202) 502-8680



From: Jette Gebhart
Sent: Thursday, September 25, 2014 10:48 AM
To: Craig Cano; Kurt Longo; Steven Wellner
Cc: Mary O'Driscoll; Leonard Tao; Andrea Spring
Subject: RE: NBC Bay Area Investigative Unit - Substation Security

From: Craig Cano
Sent: Wednesday, September 24, 2014 5:01 PM
To: Jette Gebhart; Kurt Longo; Steven Wellner
Cc: Mary O'Driscoll; Leonard Tao; Andrea Spring
Subject: FW: NBC Bay Area Investigative Unit - Substation Security

Jette,

The NBC Bay Area investigative team is back asking if the Chairman will be interviewed after having seen their report. As promised, they forward the links to their two-part report. I think it was part two that I forwarded this morning. Thanks.

Craig

Craig Cano
Media Relations / Office of External Affairs
888 First St. NE
Washington, D.C. 20426
(202) 502-8680



From: Wagner, Elizabeth (NBCUniversal) [<mailto:Elizabeth.Wagner@nbcuni.com>]
Sent: Wednesday, September 24, 2014 4:48 PM
To: Craig Cano
Cc: Kovalski, Tony (NBCUniversal, KNTV)
Subject: NBC Bay Area Investigative Unit - Substation Security

Craig,

Below, you will find links to our investigative reports about substation security.

<http://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/Year-and-a-Half-after-Attack-PGE-Security-Still-Lacking-275824131.html>

<http://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/Former-Govt-Heavyweights-Criticize-Security-at-PGE->

[-276203651-metcalf-attack-shooters.html](#)

Please let Chairman LaFleur know that we would like to speak with her about our reports and discuss an interview possibility.

Best,

Liz Wagner

--

Liz Wagner

Investigative Producer, NBC Bay Area News
o 408.432.4735 | c 408.483.2084 | f 408.432.4425
2450 N. First Street San Jose, CA 95131
elizabeth.wagner@nbcuni.com
www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations

From: Craig Cano <Craig.Cano@ferc.gov>

Date: September 4, 2014 at 1:18:27 PM EDT

To: "tony.kovaleski@nbcuni.com" <tony.kovaleski@nbcuni.com>

Subject: Chairman's statement for you

Tony,

It was good to meet you, and I appreciate you reaching out to the Commission. As we talked about, let's be in touch once the story runs regarding a possible follow up interview.

For now, this can be attributed to FERC Chairman Cheryl LaFleur:

"In protecting the grid, it is very important that we learn from all experiences, including the recent events at the Metcalf station. Protecting the reliability and resilience of the nation's electric grid is a core responsibility of the Commission and the entire electric industry. FERC has proposed to approve physical security requirements for facilities most critical to the reliable operation of the Bulk Power System. This new standard will bolster the ongoing efforts of FERC, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation and the industry to ensure grid security."

Craig

Craig Cano

Media Relations / Office of External Affairs

888 First St. NE

Washington, D.C. 20426

(202) 502-8680



From: [REDACTED]
To: [Chris Murray](#)
Cc: [Andrea Spring](#); [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Letters from Senate ENR
Date: Thursday, February 27, 2014 12:43:42 PM
Attachments: [2013r00077 - Wyden.pdf](#)
[2014r00006 - Wyden.pdf](#)
[2014-00013.pdf](#)
[2014-00017.pdf](#)
[2014r00006 - Franken.pdf](#)
[2014-00007.pdf](#)
[2014r00004.pdf](#)
[2013r00110.pdf](#)
[2013r00107.pdf](#)
[2013r00105 - Portman.pdf](#)

See attachment of letters received.

On Thu, Feb 27, 2014 at 10:43 AM, Chris Murray <chris.murray@ferc.gov> wrote:

[REDACTED] can you help identify the new letters that members of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee have sent to us since July of last year (see attached file)? Andrea, once the universe is determined can you get the links for the incoming and outgoing letters? I'll use the links to update the Senate profiles.

--

[REDACTED]
Staff Assistant
Office of External Affairs
202-502-[REDACTED]

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20426

February 11, 2014

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Ron Wyden
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Wyden:

Thank you for your letter of February 7, 2014, asking the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to determine whether federal regulations are needed to address the risk of physical attacks on our Nation's bulk power system. I agree that protecting the bulk power system against such attacks is an issue of critical importance.

Since the attack on the Metcalf facility in April 2013, the Commission's staff has taken responsive action together with NERC, other federal and state agencies, and transmission and generation asset owners and operators. The other federal agencies include the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, among others. Working together, we have explained to utilities the specific facts of the attack on Metcalf and the need for asset owners to increase the physical protection of key facilities. We have also conducted detailed grid modeling to identify the most critical facilities and helped identify protective measures that would be appropriate for particular types of facilities and locations.

For example, FERC representatives have briefed the chief executive officers of many large investor-owned utilities, cooperative utilities, and municipal utilities, as well as of the Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, which together serve nearly three-quarters of our nation's population. We have also briefed the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) and various State commissioners, in addition to the leadership of major electric industry trade associations such as the Edison Electric Institute and, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, the Large Public Power Council, and the North American Transmission Forum. And currently, we are participating with NERC, DHS, DOE, and FBI in a 13-city physical security campaign (including a detailed briefing about the Metcalf incident) intended to reach out to utilities, states, and law enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada.

To date, our efforts have focused on strongly encouraging utilities to make improvements to their physical security, by explaining why and where they should be made. This approach has resulted in improvements being implemented more quickly and more confidentially than a mandatory regulation could have accomplished under our

-2-

existing authority, as explained below. Also, the measures taken were uniquely suited to the types of facilities and locations, in a way that might be more difficult to accomplish through broad-based regulation.

Nonetheless, I agree that it is appropriate to consider whether federal regulation is needed to ensure the risk of physical attacks on our electrical infrastructure is addressed adequately. Thus, I have asked Commission staff to evaluate this issue with NERC under the authority of section 215 of the Federal Power Act. In doing so, we will make every effort to ensure the confidentiality of sensitive security information, recognizing, however, that the Commission is still subject to the Freedom of Information Act even in this area of its authority.

As Commission members and representatives have stated previously, section 215 is a reasonable approach for developing traditional reliability standards, as it uses the technical knowledge of industry through an inclusive stakeholder process to carefully develop standards that truly address long-term reliability issues. However, in the context of national security concerns, the confidentiality of sensitive security information, and the timeliness and certainty of the process, are appropriate concerns. Congress could improve the Commission's and NERC's ability to address the risks related to physical and cyber attacks by enhancing the confidentiality of sensitive security information concerning physical or cyber threats to, or vulnerabilities of, the bulk power system. A properly-defined exemption from the Freedom of Information Act would be very helpful. Also, I believe Congress should consider designating a federal department or agency (not necessarily FERC) with clear and direct authority to require actions in the event of an emergency involving a physical or cyber threat to the bulk power system. This authority should include the ability to require action before a physical or cyber national security incident has occurred. This authority should not impede FERC's existing authority under section 215 of the Federal Power Act to approve reliability standards developed by NERC through its current processes.

Thank you very much for your interest in this matter. If you have any further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,



Cheryl A. LaFleur
Acting Chairman

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20426

February 11, 2014

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Al Franken
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Franken:

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-2-

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Thank you very much for your interest in this matter. If you have any further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,



Cheryl A. LaFleur
Acting Chairman

From: [REDACTED]

To:

Aileen Roder; Andrea Spring; Andrew Weinstein; Chris Murray; David Morenoff; [REDACTED]; Jason Stanek; Jeffery Dennis; Jehmal Hudson; [REDACTED]; Jette Gebhart; John Peschke; Joshua Konecni; [REDACTED]; Kurt Longo; Laura C. Vendetta; Leonard Tao; [REDACTED]; Mary O'Driscoll; Meghan Estenson; Michael Bardee; Nicholas Tackett; [REDACTED]; Robert Ivanauskas; Robin Lunt; Robin Meidhof; Russell Fairbanks; Sandra Waldstein; Sarah McKinley; Shawn Bennett; Terence Burke

Cc:

Craig Cano; [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; Joseph McClelland

Subject:

O/G (Sen. Feinstein +) bulk power system security (2014-00006)

Date:

Tuesday, February 11, 2014 3:38:45 PM

Attachments:

2014-00006.pdf
2014r00006 - Feinstein.pdf
2014r00006 - Franken.pdf
2014r00006 - Reid.pdf
2014r00006 - Wyden.pdf
control sheet.pdf

FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.

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[REDACTED]
Staff Assistant
Office of External Affairs
202-502-[REDACTED]

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

The Honorable Cheryl LaFleur
Acting Chairman
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 1st Street NE
Washington, D.C. 20426

Mr. Gerry Cauley
President & CEO
North American Electric Reliability Corporation
3353 Peachtree Rd., NE Suite North Tower
Atlanta, GA 30326

OFFICE OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
2014 FEB 11 AM 10:29
FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION

February 7, 2014

Dear Chairman LaFleur and Mr. Cauley:

We are writing to respectfully request that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) utilize their authorities under the electricity reliability provisions of Section 1211 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAAct 2005) to determine whether additional minimum standards regarding physical security at critical substations and other essential facilities are needed to assure the reliable operation of the bulk power system.

We are confident that both FERC and NERC share our concerns regarding the threat of physical attacks on critical substations and other key facets of our nation's bulk power electricity system. Last year's sophisticated attack on the Metcalf substation in California's Silicon Valley was a wake-up call to the risk of physical attacks on the grid. This incident came uncomfortably close to causing a shutdown of a critical substation which could have resulted in a massive blackout in California and elsewhere in the West.

Last week, we met with key electricity industry and government officials involved in developing and implementing the response to the physical threat, including NERC and FERC. We came away from the meeting understanding that progress has been made by industry and government to minimize the risk of physical attacks on the electricity system through voluntary means, including information sharing, the installation of fencing, and cameras that monitor property outside substation fences.

However, we are concerned that voluntary measures may not be sufficient to constitute a reasonable response to the risk of physical attack on the electricity system. While it appears that many utilities have a firm grasp on the problem, we simply do not know if there are substantial numbers of utilities or others that have not taken adequate measures to protect against and minimize the harm from a physical attack. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Therefore, we need assurance that all entities that play a significant role in running our bulk

power electricity system are taking appropriate steps to protect against and are well prepared to respond to a physical attack.


We believe that Section 1211 of EPAct 2005 provides FERC and NERC with authority to address this matter. Prior to enactment of Section 1211 in 2005 electric reliability standards were voluntary rather than mandatory. We believe that Congress did the right thing in 2005 to transition from a voluntary reliability system to one that relies a great deal on mandatory standards developed in close consultation with industry.

FERC and NERC's authority to act on the physical threat to critical substations and other essential facilities is clear and unmistakable. EPAct 2005 authorizes FERC and NERC to develop standards "to provide for reliable operation of the bulk power system." Reliable operation is broadly defined to mean operating the bulk power system "so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance..." A physical attack on the bulk power system certainly falls comfortably within that definition.


Finally, we understand that any FERC/NERC regulatory process must maintain the confidentiality of certain data regarding threats and vulnerabilities. NERC and FERC already face this challenge in carrying out their overall reliability mission under EPAct 2005, and we believe they can do so in this instance as well.

Thank you for your consideration of this request. We would appreciate receiving responses no later than March 3, 2014.

Sincerely,


Ron Wyden
U.S. Senator


Harry Reid
U.S. Senator


Dianne Feinstein
U.S. Senator


Al Franken
U.S. Senator

Redacted Pursuant to FOIA Exemption B6

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20426

February 11, 2014

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your letter of February 7, 2014, asking the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to determine whether federal regulations are needed to address the risk of physical attacks on our Nation's bulk power system. I agree that protecting the bulk power system against such attacks is an issue of critical importance.

Since the attack on the Metcalf facility in April 2013, the Commission's staff has taken responsive action together with NERC, other federal and state agencies, and transmission and generation asset owners and operators. The other federal agencies include the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, among others. Working together, we have explained to utilities the specific facts of the attack on Metcalf and the need for asset owners to increase the physical protection of key facilities. We have also conducted detailed grid modeling to identify the most critical facilities and helped identify protective measures that would be appropriate for particular types of facilities and locations.

For example, FERC representatives have briefed the chief executive officers of many large investor-owned utilities, cooperative utilities, and municipal utilities, as well as of the Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, which together serve nearly three-quarters of our nation's population. We have also briefed the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) and various State commissioners, in addition to the leadership of major electric industry trade associations such as the Edison Electric Institute and, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, the Large Public Power Council, and the North American Transmission Forum. And currently, we are participating with NERC, DHS, DOE, and FBI in a 13-city physical security campaign (including a detailed briefing about the Metcalf incident) intended to reach out to utilities, states, and law enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada.

To date, our efforts have focused on strongly encouraging utilities to make improvements to their physical security, by explaining why and where they should be made. This approach has resulted in improvements being implemented more quickly and more confidentially than a mandatory regulation could have accomplished under our

-2-

existing authority, as explained below. Also, the measures taken were uniquely suited to the types of facilities and locations, in a way that might be more difficult to accomplish through broad-based regulation.

Nonetheless, I agree that it is appropriate to consider whether federal regulation is needed to ensure the risk of physical attacks on our electrical infrastructure is addressed adequately. Thus, I have asked Commission staff to evaluate this issue with NERC under the authority of section 215 of the Federal Power Act. In doing so, we will make every effort to ensure the confidentiality of sensitive security information, recognizing, however, that the Commission is still subject to the Freedom of Information Act even in this area of its authority.

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Thank you very much for your interest in this matter. If you have any further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,



Cheryl A. LaFleur
Acting Chairman

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20426

February 11, 2014

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Al Franken
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Franken:

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Nonetheless, I agree that it is appropriate to consider whether federal regulation is needed to ensure the risk of physical attacks on our electrical infrastructure is addressed adequately. Thus, I have asked Commission staff to evaluate this issue with NERC under the authority of section 215 of the Federal Power Act. In doing so, we will make every effort to ensure the confidentiality of sensitive security information, recognizing, however, that the Commission is still subject to the Freedom of Information Act even in this area of its authority.

As Commission members and representatives have stated previously, section 215 is a reasonable approach for developing traditional reliability standards, as it uses the technical knowledge of industry through an inclusive stakeholder process to carefully develop standards that truly address long-term reliability issues. However, in the context of national security concerns, the confidentiality of sensitive security information, and the timeliness and certainty of the process, are appropriate concerns. Congress could improve the Commission's and NERC's ability to address the risks related to physical and cyber attacks by enhancing the confidentiality of sensitive security information concerning physical or cyber threats to, or vulnerabilities of, the bulk power system. A properly-defined exemption from the Freedom of Information Act would be very helpful. Also, I believe Congress should consider designating a federal department or agency (not necessarily FERC) with clear and direct authority to require actions in the event of an emergency involving a physical or cyber threat to the bulk power system. This authority should include the ability to require action before a physical or cyber national security incident has occurred. This authority should not impede FERC's existing authority under section 215 of the Federal Power Act to approve reliability standards developed by NERC through its current processes.

Thank you very much for your interest in this matter. If you have any further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,



Cheryl A. LaFleur
Acting Chairman

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20426

February 11, 2014

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Harry Reid
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Majority Leader Reid:

Thank you for your letter of February 7, 2014, asking the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to determine whether federal regulations are needed to address the risk of physical attacks on our Nation's bulk power system. I agree that protecting the bulk power system against such attacks is an issue of critical importance.

Since the attack on the Metcalf facility in April 2013, the Commission's staff has taken responsive action together with NERC, other federal and state agencies, and transmission and generation asset owners and operators. The other federal agencies include the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, among others. Working together, we have explained to utilities the specific facts of the attack on Metcalf and the need for asset owners to increase the physical protection of key facilities. We have also conducted detailed grid modeling to identify the most critical facilities and helped identify protective measures that would be appropriate for particular types of facilities and locations.

For example, FERC representatives have briefed the chief executive officers of many large investor-owned utilities, cooperative utilities, and municipal utilities, as well as of the Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, which together serve nearly three-quarters of our nation's population. We have also briefed the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) and various State commissioners, in addition to the leadership of major electric industry trade associations such as the Edison Electric Institute and, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, the Large Public Power Council, and the North American Transmission Forum. And currently, we are participating with NERC, DHS, DOE, and FBI in a 13-city physical security campaign (including a detailed briefing about the Metcalf incident) intended to reach out to utilities, states, and law enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada.

To date, our efforts have focused on strongly encouraging utilities to make improvements to their physical security, by explaining why and where they should be made. This approach has resulted in improvements being implemented more quickly and

-2-


more confidentially than a mandatory regulation could have accomplished under our existing authority, as explained below. Also, the measures taken were uniquely suited to the types of facilities and locations, in a way that might be more difficult to accomplish through broad-based regulation.

Nonetheless, I agree that it is appropriate to consider whether federal regulation is needed to ensure the risk of physical attacks on our electrical infrastructure is addressed adequately. Thus, I have asked Commission staff to evaluate this issue with NERC under the authority of section 215 of the Federal Power Act. In doing so, we will make every effort to ensure the confidentiality of sensitive security information, recognizing, however, that the Commission is still subject to the Freedom of Information Act even in this area of its authority.

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Thank you very much for your interest in this matter. If you have any further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,



Cheryl A. LaFleur
Acting Chairman

Redacted Pursuant to FOIA Exemption B6

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20426

February 11, 2014

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Ron Wyden
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Wyden:

Thank you for your letter of February 7, 2014, asking the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to determine whether federal regulations are needed to address the risk of physical attacks on our Nation's bulk power system. I agree that protecting the bulk power system against such attacks is an issue of critical importance.

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-2-

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Thank you very much for your interest in this matter. If you have any further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,



Cheryl A. LaFleur
Acting Chairman

Ivy Gibson

From: Jon Wellinghoff <jbwellinghoff@yahoo.com>
Sent: Sunday, October 20, 2013 7:10 PM
To: Leonard Tao; [REDACTED]
Cc: David Morenoff; Charles Beamon
Subject: Fwd: Press Release and Social Media Announcements

Just a heads up for everyone. The Stoel Rives Partners officially voted on Friday to make me a Partner in the firm upon my departure from FERC. Below is the short press release that they will issue tomorrow. I discussed this release with Charles.

Stoel thought this was necessary and appropriate now that 100+ partners at Stoel know this news. It provides the minimal information while helping to stem the rumors that would result without a release.

Please let me know if there is anything else I should do on this.

Thanks,

Jon

Jon Wellinghoff

For immediate release
Stoel Rives LLP:

October 21, 2013
(202) 398-1794

r@stoel.com

(206) 386-7636

@stoel.com

(503) 294-9831

s@stoel.com

Contact

Gregory F. Jenner, Partner,

gfiene

Alan R. Merkle, Chairman,

armerkle

Judy L. Rooks, Marketing Communications Mgr.,

jlook

FERC CHAIR TO JOIN STOEL RIVES LLP

San Francisco and Washington, D.C. — The law firm of Stoel Rives LLP today announced that Jon Wellinghoff, Chair of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), will join the firm upon completion of his service at FERC. Wellinghoff submitted his resignation to the President on May 28, but no date has been announced for his departure from FERC.

Stoel Rives is widely recognized for its energy law practice. Close to 100 attorneys across the firm practice in the field of energy. The firm has received a prestigious National First-Tier ranking for Energy Law in every edition of the annual *U.S. News-Best Lawyers®* "Best Law Firms" survey and has been recognized as one of the nation's best law firms for Renewables & Alternative Energy by independent researcher *Chambers and Partners* for four consecutive years.

<PRESS RELEASE - FERC CHAIR TO JOIN STOEL
RIVES.DOCX>

<CONFIDENTIAL_ Wellinghoff Social Media Press
Announcement Schedule.docx>

Ivy Gibson

From: Jon Wellinghoff
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 4:40 PM
To: Charles Beamon
Subject: Re: Quick follow-up

Sure Charles. No problem. Thanks.

Jon

Jon Wellinghoff
FERC
888 1st Street NE
Washington, DC 20426
Office 202.5026580

On Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 1:36 PM, Charles Beamon <charles.beamon@ferc.gov> wrote:

Chairman Wellinghoff:

We've notice a typo in the post-employment letter I issued to you on September 13. Page 4, last paragraph, should read "you may not disclose non-public information that came to you through Commission employment." The word "not" was inadvertently omitted from your letter. Thanks Commissioner. If I may be of further assistance to you, please let me know.

David Morenoff

From: Joseph McClelland
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2013 3:55 PM
To: Jon Wellinghoff; James Pederson; David Morenoff; Christy Walsh
Subject: FW: help: Gunfire Vandalism at PG&E's Metcalf Substation <External Sender>

Jon,

Joe

From: Bose, Sanjay [mailto:BOESAS@coned.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2013 3:10 PM
To: Joseph McClelland
Subject: RE: help: Gunfire Vandalism at PG&E's Metcalf Substation <External Sender>

Joe – I did call your office and I know you are in a meeting. I am running off to a board meeting on summer preparedness and should be done by 5:30 PM. Is it possible I can call you after that? If so what number should I call?

Thanks
Sanjay

From: Joseph McClelland [mailto:joseph.mcclelland@ferc.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2013 2:22 PM
To: Bose, Sanjay
Subject: RE: help: Gunfire Vandalism at PG&E's Metcalf Substation <External Sender>

Sure I can give you the information if you call me at 202-502-8867. We have been working this one

From: Bose, Sanjay [mailto:BOESAS@coned.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2013 2:20 PM
To: Joseph McClelland
Subject: help: Gunfire Vandalism at PG&E's Metcalf Substation <External Sender>
Joe can you please help me with getting some more information.
Sanjay

From: Ivey, Craig
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2013 2:18 PM
To: Cawley, Timothy; Burke, Kevin; Longhi, William G.; McAvoy, John
Cc: Sanchez, Robert (S&TO); Bose, Sanjay; Braz, Aubrey T.; Campanella, Michele
Subject: RE: Gunfire Vandalism at PG&E's Metcalf Substation <External Sender>
Sanjay,
Chairman Wellinghoff spoke at a recent EEL meeting in DC regarding grid security.

Heres my recollection of his comments:

He was more concerned (in a relative sense) about physical security than cyber security.



He mentioned their visit with us without naming the company.

Can we find out more regarding the briefing from your contacts at FERC?

Craig


From: Cawley, Timothy

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2013 12:42 PM

To: Burke, Kevin; Longhi, William G.; McAvoy, John; Ivey, Craig (IVEYC@coned.com)

Cc: Sanchez, Robert (S&TO) (SANCHEZRO@coned.com); Bose, Sanjay (BOSESA@coned.com); Braz, Aubrey T.; Campanella, Michele

Subject: RE: Gunfire Vandalism at PG&E's Metcalf Substation <External Sender>



From: Burke, Kevin

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2013 11:35 AM

To: Cawley, Timothy

Subject: RE: Gunfire Vandalism at PG&E's Metcalf Substation <External Sender>



From: Cawley, Timothy

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2013 11:18 AM

To: BurkeK@coned.com; Ivey, Craig (IVEYC@coned.com); Longhi, William G.; McAvoy, John

Cc: Sanchez, Robert (S&TO) (SANCHEZRO@coned.com); Bose, Sanjay (BOSESA@coned.com); Braz, Aubrey T.

Subject: FW: Gunfire Vandalism at PG&E's Metcalf Substation <External Sender>

FYI regarding vandalism at PG&Es Metcalf Substation.

From: Sanchez, Robert (S&TO)

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2013 7:50 AM

To: Cawley, Timothy; Bose, Sanjay

Subject: FW: Gunfire Vandalism at PG&E's Metcalf Substation <External Sender>

Tim/Sanjay,

FYI only.

Please see the highlighted section below from SNL.

We were able to gather up the following -



From: "SNL Alerts" <snlalerts@snl.com>
Date: April 16, 2013, 7:08:02 PM EDT
To: "Sanchez, Robert (S&TO)" <sanchezro@coned.com>
Subject: SNL End-of-Day Summary <External Sender>
Reply-To: <snlalerts@snl.com>

EXTERNAL SENDER. Do not click on links if sender is unknown and never provide use

Forgot your username and password? [Click here.](#)
To change your SNL E-Mail Alert Settings: [Click here.](#)

SNL

My SNL Summary

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Top News

UPDATE: PG&E so far avoiding power interruptions with Metcalf substation outage

4/16/2013 5:46 PM ET

With gunfire damage to a substation suspected as an act of vandalism and not terrorism, Silicon Valley tech giants and other customers in the San Francisco Bay area have been weathering a mild spring day without power supply issues.

Referenced Companies: CPN PCG

Xcel Energy proposes new gas-fired units in Minnesota, North Dakota

4/16/2013 5:31 PM ET

But the company's proposal to boost generation capacity will compete with other plans, including those from Calpine Corp., Great River Energy and Invenergy LLC.

Referenced Companies: XEL CPN

Atlas Pipeline Partners to acquire TEAK Midstream Eagle Ford assets for \$1B

4/16/2013 5:18 PM ET

Atlas Pipeline Partners has executed a definitive agreement to acquire 100% of TEAK Midstream's equity interests for \$1 billion in cash, according to an April 16 news release.

Referenced Companies: APL

Energy Future filing tips hand on valuation negotiations with creditors

4/16/2013 4:42 PM ET

Wall Street investors and analysts got an inside look at how much money KKR, Goldman Sachs and TPG Capital expect Energy Future Holdings to make in the next five years when the company released financial information April 15 as part of its negotiations for a prepackaged bankruptcy with a group of senior creditors.

SEPA: Solar's top 10 utility users accounted for 73% of integrated capacity in 2012

4/16/2013 4:30 PM ET

Documents

PR: Atlas Pipeline Partners, L.P. To Acquire Eagle Ford Midstream Business For \$1 Billion From TEAK Midstream 4/16/2013

8-K: Atlas Pipeline Partners LP (APL) 4/16/2013

PR: The Caisse publishes its 2012 Annual Report 4/16/2013

8-K: News Corp. (NWSA) 4/16/2013

PR: Targa Resources Announces First Quarter 2013 Dividend and Distribution 4/16/2013

PR: Atlas Pipeline Partners, L.P. Announces Public Offering Of Common Units 4/16/2013

8-K: Regency Energy Partners LP (RGP) 4/16/2013

PR: CAISO: Urgent conservation needed NOW in Santa Clara & Silicon Valley 4/16/2013

8-K: EOG Resources (EOG) 4/16/2013

PR: Targa Resources Announces Timing of First Quarter 2013 Earnings Releases and Conference Call 4/16/2013

Research Reports

There are no recent research reports that match your settings.

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MEETING

Meet
New York Cha
Garry Brov

April 29, 20

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Account

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utility companie

The list of utilities that made the biggest plays in solar in 2012 is full of names that were not there last year, a sign that more power providers are committed to diversifying their electricity portfolios with solar as costs decline, according to the Solar Electric Power Association.

Referenced Companies: NRG

In sector outlook, Wells Fargo upgrades Southern, dims AEP, Exelon view

4/16/2013 3:58 PM ET

In an April 15 sector outlook, Wells Fargo Securities took ratings actions on covered electric utilities including Southern Co., Exelon and American Electric Power.

Referenced Companies: CNL FE CMS NEE ITC OGE SCG AEP SO EXC (...)

Trinity Coal debtors include Dominion, ArcelorMittal, CSX, Norfolk Southern

4/16/2013 2:28 PM ET

Power company Dominion Resources Inc. and international steelmakers ArcelorMittal and Essar Group are among the coal buyers holding outstanding contracts with Trinity Coal Corp., which is undergoing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy restructuring.

Referenced Companies: D

Gunfire at Calif. substation threatens power in Silicon Valley

4/16/2013 2:08 PM ET

The California ISO urged residents and businesses in the San Jose, Calif., area, in particular Santa Clara and Silicon Valley, to conserve electricity April 16 after one or more vandals shot up and heavily damaged a substation.

Referenced Companies: CPN PCG

US power mixed, lackluster despite CAISO's call for conservation

4/16/2013 1:55 PM ET

Most next-day power prices continued to drift Tuesday, April 16, as varied load and soft gas prices did little to sway markets in one particular direction.

Regulatory Roundup: EPA seeks revisions to oil, gas sector NSPS; Miss. Legislature cuts taxes on fracking

4/16/2013 1:34 PM ET

A weekly snapshot of recent regulatory activity in the midstream and gas utility sectors.

Referenced Companies: TRP ENB

Hires and Fires

Clean Power Finance appoints chairman

4/16/2013 5:22 PM ET

Currently, Ghatalia is the president of San Francisco-based investment firm Hennessey Capital Management.

Peabody CEO Boyce named to Monsanto board

4/16/2013 1:28 PM ET

Peabody Energy Corp. Chairman and CEO Gregory Boyce has been appointed to the board of agriculture products giant Monsanto Co., effective immediately, according to an April 16 news release.

Referenced Companies: BTU RIO

Upcoming Events

Expected Earnings Releases

BTU

4/18/2013

Conference Calls

Covanta

4/18/2013 8:30 AM ET

Holding Corp.

(CVA)

(800) 860-2442

Peabody

4/18/2013 11:00 AM ET

Energy Corp.

(BTU)

(800) 230-1085

Company Meetings

AES Corp.

4/18/2013 9:30 AM ET

(AES)

Annual Shareholder

Hallador

4/18/2013 10:30 AM ET

Energy Co

(HNRG)

Annual Shareholder

Unitil Corp.

4/18/2013 10:30 AM ET

(UTL)

Annual Shareholder

Industry Conferences

Platts 8th Annual Northeast Energy Markets Conf

4/23/2013 - 4/24/2013

SNL Seminar: Principles of Valuation in the Power Sector

4/23/2013 - 4/24/2013

EMI Energy Introduction to Energy Trading & Hedging

4/24/2013 - 4/25/2013

EMI Energy Power Trading & Hedging Fundamentals

4/24/2013 - 4/25/2013

NECA April 2013 Board and Dinner Meeting

4/25/2013

EEL Transmission, Distribution & Metering Conference

4/28/2013 - 5/1/2013

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Power Sec

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KnowledgeC

Topical industry
webinars
and podcasts

Gain your
competitive e

In the Boardroom

Stark Investments winding down

4/16/2013 3:39 PM ET

Stark Investments is closing all funds except for one and will ultimately return all outside capital.

Star Gas Partners increases Q2 distribution

4/16/2013 1:26 PM ET

The distribution is payable May 6 to unit holders of record April 26.

Referenced Companies: SGU

Infrastructure Development

EDF Renewable acquires remaining interests in 161-MW Texas wind farm

4/16/2013 5:05 PM ET

EDF Renewable Energy exercised an option to acquire the remaining 49% interest in the 161-MW Spinning Spur II Wind project in Oldham County, Texas, from Cielo Wind Power.

Markets

Tuesday's Energy Stocks: ITC, Entergy shares up after shareholders approve wires merger

4/16/2013 5:56 PM ET

Shares of ITC Holdings gained 1.71% to close at \$92.01 in average trading on the New York Stock Exchange Tuesday, April 16, after the company's shareholders voted in favor of its proposed merger with the transmission business of Entergy.

Referenced Companies: ATP EIX WMB NKA MWE MMLP GXP JRCC WR ETR (...)

Mergers and Acquisitions

ArcLight Capital acquires American Midstream, appoints executive chairman, COO

4/16/2013 4:07 PM ET

ArcLight Capital Partners, through its portfolio company High Point Infrastructure Partners, has acquired 100% of the subordinated units of American Midstream Partners and 90% of American Midstream's general partner from Aim Midstream Holdings.

Referenced Companies: AMID

Operations and Strategy

Xcel Energy: Sherco 3 coal unit may return to service by end of September

4/16/2013 5:52 PM ET

Xcel Energy now believes the damaged unit 3 of its Sherburne County, Minn., coal-fired plant may return to service on or about Sept. 30. But further delays are still possible as the utility works through repairs and an investigation into the cause of the damage.

Referenced Companies: XEL

4/29/2013 - 5/1/2013

NEM's 16th Annual National Energy Restructuring Conference

4/29/2013 - 5/1/2013

Euromoney North American Midstream Infrastructure Finance Forum

4/30/2013 - 5/1/2013

EBA Spring 2013 Annual Meeting & Conf

5/1/2013 - 5/2/2013

EMI Energy Physical Natural Gas Trading

5/1/2013 - 5/2/2013

Bank of America Merrill Lynch China Energy&Clean Env Corp Day

5/2/2013 - 5/3/2013

AGA Financial Forum

5/5/2013 - 5/7/2013

AGA Legislative Forum

5/5/2013 - 5/8/2013

AWEA WINDPOWER 2013 Conference & Exhibition

5/5/2013 - 5/8/2013

CAMPUT 2013 Annual Conference

5/5/2013 - 5/8/2013

Nomura U.S. Industrials and Metals & Mining Corporate Day

5/6/2013

EMI Energy Futures Options & Derivatives

5/6/2013 - 5/7/2013

EUCI Electric Utility Basics Seminar

5/6/2013 - 5/7/2013

EMI Energy Natural Gas Fundamentals

5/7/2013

Standard & Poor's Elec Co-op & Public Power Hot Topics Conf

5/7/2013

CAPUC Safety Culture

5/7/2013 - 5/8/2013

Robert W. Baird & Co. Inc. Growth Stock Conference

5/7/2013 - 5/9/2013

New Events

Idaho Power seeks \$140M rate increase to pay for higher energy costs

4/16/2013 5:45 PM ET

Idaho Power applied for a \$140.4 million rate increase for 12 months starting June 1 to pay for increased energy costs mainly due to a forecast drop in hydropower production the utility depends upon for more than half its electricity and increased qualified facilities purchase costs.

Referenced Companies: IDA

Tough tax regime may deter coal investments in Queensland, exec says

4/16/2013 5:14 PM ET

Australian state Queensland's tough tax measures could impact future investment in the local coal industry, despite the strong demand for coal projected in the long term, Mining Weekly reported April 16, citing the Queensland Resources Council's CEO.

Referenced Companies: BTU RIO BHP XTA

NH regulators approve settlement in suspended electric supplier case

4/16/2013 5:00 PM ET

Under the settlement agreed to by PNE, Resident Power and commission staff, all former PNE customers placed on default service with PSNH on Feb. 20 will get a one-time payment of \$9.50.

Referenced Companies: NU

Inter Pipeline signs new ethane sales contract with NOVA

4/16/2013 3:52 PM ET

Inter Pipeline Fund has entered into a new contract with NOVA Chemicals for the long-term sale of ethane from Inter Pipeline's extraction facilities in Cochrane, Alberta.

Referenced Companies: IPL.UN

Cardero Resource further extends option to acquire met coal project in Canada

4/16/2013 2:31 PM ET

Canada-listed Cardero Resource Corp. said April 16 that it has extended an option to acquire four coal licenses that form part of the Carbon Creek metallurgical coal project in British Columbia.

Referenced Companies: CDU

BC Hydro files description for 6th unit at Revelstoke dam

4/16/2013 1:31 PM ET

BC Hydro has submitted to British Columbia environmental regulators a plan to add a sixth unit of about 500 MW to its Revelstoke hydroelectric facility.

RRA News

RRA Regulatory Focus: RRAAlert--Michigan PSC adopts Infrastructure Recovery Mechanism for DTE Gas

4/16/2013 4:09 PM ET

On April 16, the Michigan PSC authorized DTE Gas to implement a multi-year Infrastructure Recovery Mechanism.

Referenced Companies: DTE

Expected Earnings Releases

<u>APL</u>	4/30/2013
<u>NEE</u>	4/30/2013
<u>ATP</u>	5/8/2013

Conference Calls

<u>NextEra Energy Inc. (NEE)</u>	4/30/2013 9:00 AM ET
<u>Atlas Pipeline Partners LP (APL)</u>	5/1/2013 10:00 AM ET
<u>Atlantic Power Corp. (ATP)</u>	5/9/2013 8:30 AM ET

Company Meetings

No new company meetings have been posted since your last summary was sent.

Industry Conferences

No new conferences have been posted since your last summary was sent.

**RRA Regulatory Focus: Rate Freezes: Their
Historical Context and Prevalence Today**

4/16/2013 3:39 PM ET

In an April 16 RRA Topical Special Report, SNL Financial subsidiary Regulatory Research Associates provides a historical context for energy utility rate freezes, and discusses the current prevalence of such arrangements in the industry.

Referenced Companies: PCG

Market Indexes

Industry Indexes	Value	1 Day(%)	MTD(%)	YTD(%)	Last Update
<u>Energy</u>	292.13	1.41	0.87	14.70	April 16
<u>DJ Utility</u>	522.32	1.16	1.56	13.95	4:36 PM ET
<u>Gas Util</u>	415.20	2.21	0.58	14.16	April 16
<u>Coal</u>	218.40	0.56	(5.86)	(10.31)	April 16
Broad Market					
<u>DJIA</u>	14,756.78	1.08	1.22	12.61	April 16
<u>S&P 500</u>	1,574.57	1.43	0.34	10.40	April 16
<u>NASDAQ</u>	3,264.63	1.50	(0.09)	8.12	April 16

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David Morenoff

From: Joseph McClelland
Sent: Monday, March 17, 2014 12:55 PM
To: Cheryl LaFleur; Joshua Konecni; Kurt Longo; Jette Gebhart; David Morenoff
Subject: Metcalf TV Report

Just happened to see this CBN report. This is the most comprehensive TV spot I've seen regarding physical attacks on the power grid and it does quote Jon Wellinghoff's comment regarding domestic terrorism - link below. In addition, the reporter visits 3 sites including Metcalf and Farragut and interviews EPRI as well. I'll let ConEd know that Farragut was filmed for this report.

Thanks,
Joe

www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2014/March/Power-Grid-Target-in-New-Attack-on-America

Sent from my iPad

David Morenoff

From: Joseph McClelland
Sent: Monday, August 26, 2013 7:56 AM
To: Jon Wellinghoff; James Pederson; Michael McLaughlin (OEMR); David Morenoff; Christy Walsh; Jeff Wright; Ann Miles; Michael Bardee; Edward Franks
Cc: Harry Tom
Subject: North American Transmission Forum (NATF) and EPRI Physical Security Summit

Jon,
The NATF/EPRI summit last Thursday in Charlotte, NC was well-attended by the industry. The purpose of the summit was to discuss the current state of security/events with regard to the power grid as well as discuss potential physical security solutions/practices/research.

As you are aware, the keynote speaker was Mary Landry, Special Assistant to the President, Senior Director for Resilience Policy. Her discussion with industry was direct; there are growing threats to the nation's critical infrastructure ranging from deliberate attacks all the way through climate change and the best way to address them is through engagement in public/private partnerships between government and industry. She stated that we cannot regulate our way through this challenge (although she also said that regulations will always be necessary and important). She and the Administration believe that security is intertwined with resiliency; ensuring that the system can take a hit and continue to run - or recover quickly in the event that it does go down. She is very familiar with, and supportive of, FERC (she said she worked with Mark Robinson for years on LNG safety issues while with the Coast Guard) and particularly likes the collaborative concept you set up with OEIS (she said it mirrors the Administration's current collaborative approach). She thanked me for alerting her to the event and stayed for the entire day as she said this type of engagement with the industry is key to getting the job done.

I briefly covered the role of OEIS and re-capped some of our accomplishments with industry to-date. I centered on the President's EO from February of this year tying OEIS' work to the sections; Section 4 – information sharing (open and classified briefings for the ISO/RTOs, LPPA, NRECA, NERC, EEI, State Commissions, etc.), Section 7 – development of framework of security best practices and, Section 9 – modeling the most critical infrastructure facilities. I then covered the timeline (including our key actions) and most significant aspects of Metcalf –

I finished with some mitigation measures that could deter physical attacks against critical facilities. The audience was very engaged when I presented and there were so many questions that the moderator (Tom Galloway) had to cut them off.

Other speakers included a DHS representative (who talked about various programs they offer at no cost to the industry), a DOE representative (who discussed their sector-specific lead with energy infrastructure security as well as some of their work in physical security), and a NERC and SERC official who explained their efforts to review the security practices of industry in a non-regulatory manner (I cannot recall a single reference to a NERC standard or requirement during the entire summit) so as to further security.

Although I was invited back by Tom Galloway and a NATF board member to their next session, I asked that they consider making OEIS involvement a more structured part of the NATF – carving out engagement for both cyber and physical security topics. I can provide more detail on any subject should you wish.

Thanks,
Joe